Abstract-Shadow price and Vickrey price are two classic metrics that can be applied to measure the relative importance of links in a communication network. Each metric has been extensively investigated and enjoys important applications. We study the underlying connections between these two metrics with seemingly different definitions, under a general mathematical model of multipath multi-session multicast routing. We show that Vickrey prices provide upper-bounds for shadow prices in general, and the fine granularity version of Vickrey price, unit Vickrey price, equals exactly the maximum shadow price. We further design an efficient algorithm that computes all-link max/min shadow prices and unit Vickrey prices simultaneously, for unicast routing, reducing the complexity of a straightforward algorithm by an order of O(|E|).
I. INTRODUCTION
How important is a link in a communication network, and how can such importance of links be algorithmically evaluated in the most efficient way? The studies in this paper center around these two basic yet fundamental questions within the context of multi-path routing of information flows. Informally, a link's "importance" is associated with its contribution towards the routing task, and depends on network parameters such as the topology of the network, capacities and costs of links, the form of applications supported by routing (e.g., unicast vs. multicast), the location of senders/receivers and the location of the link itself. Two classic metrics for measuring link importance, shadow price [1] - [3] and Vickrey price [4] - [7] , have been proposed and studied extensively, in mostly separate directions, and both enjoy a wide range of applications in fields such as network game theory, network mechanism design and congestion control [1] , [3] , [5] , [8] .
The Vickrey price of a link measures its "added value" to the routing task, i.e., the increase in routing cost that would occur with the removal of this link [5] - [7] . A fine granularity version, unit Vickrey price, is the increase in routing cost if a link's capacity is decremented by one unit. The former pertains to those where where links function or fail as a whole [5] , [6] , and the latter applies to scenarios where link capacities may fluctuate due to background traffic or capacity management. Conversely, one may also define the unit Vickrey gain, measuring cost reduction due to link capacity increment. Vickrey prices and gains help the network operator determine which links are more critical and which less so, which links are over-provisioned in capacity and which links most deserve augmentation. The application of Vickrey price goes beyond these natural interpretations. In network game theory, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG) mechanism [4] utilizes Vickrey prices for incentive engineering. It has been shown that in various versions of optimal traffic routing [3] , [8] , paying a rational link its claimed cost plus its Vickrey price economically motivates a truthful report in cost.
Shadow prices, from a primal-dual perspective, are optimal dual solutions where routing is modeled in the primal program [2] , [3] . By complementary slackness [2] , a shadow price vector is valid if and only if there is a corresponding primal (routing flow), such that only saturated links have a non-zero shadow price and the cost of each utilized routing paths is of equal minimum cost among all paths available [3] , [8] . The importance and wide range of applications of shadow prices are manifested by its multi-facet nature: from an economic perspective, shadow price is closely related to the marketclearing price of a resource that consumers are willing to pay; from an optimization perspective, shadow price represents the rate of change in the objective function upon infinitesimally small perturbations at a constraint [2] ; from a geometric perspective, shadow prices can be interpreted as subgradients of the objective function along the dimension of resource provisioning changes [2] ; from a game theoretic perspective, the maximum shadow price gives the opportunity cost of a resource owner who truthfully reveals her own cost; from a mechanism design perspective, shadow prices are equivalent to stabilizing taxes/tolls that enforce optimal flow routing [3] , [8] , [9] ; from a congestion control perspective, shadow prices are valuable indications of link congestion [1] , [10] . Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 illustrate the concept of Vickrey price and shadow price respectively. Optimal routing cost increases to 11. Therefore, the Vickrey price of link e is 11 − 7 = 4.
Despite seemingly different definitions, originating from different motivations and having different applications, shadow
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978-1-4244-3513-5/09/$25.00 ©2009 IEEE prices and Vickrey prices both model the relative importance of links. How closely are they related to each other? By exploiting the underlying combinatorial structure of the multipath routing problem, we provide an informative characterization of their relation. We model multipath multi-session routing using the mathematical optimization framework, and apply duality and complementary slackness to show that all shadow prices are always upper-bounded by the (unit) Vickrey price, and lower-bounded by the unit Vickrey gain. Furthermore, the maximum and minimum shadow prices of a link exactly equal its unit Vickrey price and unit Vickrey gain respectively, in a class of routing problems that have the property we refer to as saturation-critical. This class includes all unicast routing problems, and most multicast routing problems. Since shadow price is not unique, it is natural to determine its range by computing the maximum and minimum shadow prices respectively. For Vickrey prices, Nisan and Ronen [11] proposed the question, what is the computational complexity of determining all Vickrey prices, as an important open problem in algorithmic mechanism design. We design an efficient algorithm for computing all-link unit Vickrey prices/gains (and therefore all-link max/min shadow prices), for multipath unicast routing. Our algorithm solves optimal routing once in the beginning, then proceeds to compute unit Vickrey prices for all links simultaneously, based on an allpairs shortest path computation in the residual network of the optimal flow. It reduces the complexity of O(|E|) min-cost flow computations of a straightforward algorithm to O(1) mincost flow computations, which is necessary for computing just one-link unit Vickrey price and is the best one can hope for. This advances previous work of Hershberger and Suri [6] , [7] on the subject of shortest path, which is a special case of single-path unicast routing.
In the rest of the paper, we review related research in Sec. II, and present the problem model and preliminaries in Sec. III. The relations between shadow prices and Vickrey prices are established in Sec. IV, the joint algorithm is presented in Sec. V and Sec. VI concludes the paper.
II. PREVIOUS RESEARCH
The economic concept of shadow price has spawned many applications in networking research in recent years. One category is related to the "stabilizing" effect of shadow prices.
By taking the primal-dual framework and applying complementary slackness or Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, one can often show that optimal flow routing becomes a stable solution (Nash/Wardrop Equilibrium) if shadow prices are applied as link taxes or tolls. Fleischer et al. [8] extended such a result from one session (network flows) to multiple sessions (multi-commodity flows). Bhadra et al. [9] and Li [3] generalized the result from unicast to multicast. Another category of applications is related to rate control. A link computes its shadow price representing the current tightness of its bandwidth supply. Each source collects shadow prices along its routing paths and uses the aggregated price as an important reference in adjusting its sending rate. Such a rate control algorithm is amenable to distributed implementations, and often has mathematically proven convergence, optimality and fairness guarantees [1] . Connections between such shadow price based rate control and congestion control algorithms implemented in the Transport Control Protocol (TCP) on the Internet have also been examined [1] , [10] .
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves method [4] has been at the focal point of strategyproof mechanism design [5] , [12] . Informally, the essence of a VCG mechanism is to pay each used agent its declared cost plus its added value. The added value is the added utility or reduced cost that arises due to the existence of this agent, and is referred to as the Vickrey price [6] , [7] . An agent's dominant strategy under a VCG mechanism is to report her true utility/cost, i.e., there is no economic incentive for her to lie. Therefore Vickrey prices are important in incentive engineering and strategyproof mechanism design. The major drawback of a VCG mechanism is that it runs a (potentially large) budget deficiency. Further research exists in controlling such budget deficiency and in designing strategyproof mechanisms of a non-VCG nature [5] , [12] .
While game theory, both in economics and in networks, has been extensively studied in the past decades, its computational aspect has attracted research attention only recently and has witnessed less progresses. In particular, we understand much better how to apply Vickrey prices than how to compute them. A straightforward algorithm for all-link Vickrey prices has a high overall complexity due to redundant computation. Hershberger and Suri [6] , [7] study the problem of removing such redundancy for efficient computation of all-link Vickrey prices, for the shortest path problem. This problem is equivalent to computing the unit-Vickrey price of all links in an unit capacity network with respect to a unicast routing problem of flow rate 1. Based on graph theoretic techniques, they successfully reduced the required number of shortest path computations from O(|V |) to O(1). Algorithm 5.1 in this paper computes the unit Vickrey price of all links with respect to unicast routing with arbitrary throughput in networks with arbitrary link capacities. In comparison with the naive algorithm, it achieves a reduction in complexity of up to a factor of O(|E|). Thus, in comparison, we study the simpler problem of computing unit Vickrey price of all the links but in the more general setting of unicast.
III. NETWORK MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
We model a computer network as a directed graph 
We adopt the definition of shadow price provided within the linear programming framework [1] - [3] , [8] . The LP's that model the minimum cost multi-session multicast can be found in [13] and are not presented here due to space limits. We refer to the LP that models minimum cost multi-session multicast as the primal. Denote the minimum cost multi-session multicast linear program for the routing problem (G, M ) by LP p (G, M ) and its dual by LP d (G, M ). For a link e, its capacity bound will be part of the constraints in the primal and the dual variable that corresponds to this constraint, denoted as t(e), is a shadow price of link e. Every optimal solution to the dual provides a shadow price to each link in the network. A vector consisting of these shadow prices is a shadow price vector. Following the notation of Li, we denote by y m,r (e) the cost share of receiver r in session m on link e.
IV. THE RELATION BETWEEN SHADOW PRICES AND VICKREY PRICES
We first prove that any shadow price of a link provides a lower-bound for its Vickrey price. We then combine the combinatorial properties of multi-session flows with linear programming duality to prove a theorem that establishes an equality relation between the maximum shadow price and the unit Vickrey price in a class of routing problems we call 'saturation-critical', which includes most practical routing problems. We finally discuss implications and potential applications of this result.
A. Shadow Prices Provide Lower-Bounds for Vickrey Prices
Following Li [3] , we say that a cost allocation together with a tax vector (y, t) enforces an optimal multi-session multicast flow f * (= m f * m ), if together f * and (y, t) satisfy: (1) stability, f * is a Nash flow under (y, t), (2) budget balance, (w(e) + t * (e))f * (e) = m r∈Rm y m,r (e)f m (e), ∀e . Li [3] showed that an optimal multicast flow f * remains optimal even when the cost vector w is replaced by another cost vector w = w + t * , where t * is some shadow price vector. This result can be extended to multi-session multicast in a straightforward fashion [13] . We use Theorem 4.1 to show that the shadow price of a link is less than or equal to its Vickrey price. 
Theorem 4.2: With respect to a given multi-session multicast routing problem (G, M ), the Vickrey price of each link e is lower-bounded by c(e)t
which implies:
In the derivations above, → uv w(
is the Vickrey price of e by definition. ≥ 1 is by simple arithmetic manipulation and the observation that since c G−e (e) = 0, f * G−e (e) = 0. = 2 is by complementary slackness: since we assume t * (e) > 0, we know f * G (e) = c G (e), i.e., only saturated links can have non-zero shadow prices. ≥ 3 is also due to complementary slackness: either t * (
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B. The Equivalence between Max Shadow Price and Unit Vickrey Price

Lemma 4.2: An optimal solution
Since the cost of the optimal solution is a convex function of c(
Combining equations 1 and 2, W (G, M )+c(e)δ ≤ γ +(c(e)− β)δ = |f |. However, this contradicts the assumption that
We are now ready to present and prove the following equality relation between shadow prices and Vickrey prices: Theorem 4.3: Let (G, M ) be any multi-session multicast problem. For any edge e ∈ E G , if there is an optimal solution to (G, M ) that saturates e, then the unit Vickrey price of link e equals the maximum shadow price at e. Proof: Let f * be an optimal solution to (G, M ) such that f * (e) = c(e). Let, δ be the unit Vickrey price of edge e, that is,
also an optimal solution to (G , M) , where G = G w(e)+δ . For clarity, denote by f *
Hence, any optimal solution to (G c(e)−1 , M) that saturates edge e is also optimal to W (G , M). Lemma 4.1 guarantees that (G c(e)−1 , M) has an optimal solution that saturates e. It follows from this that the unit Vickrey price of edge e with respect to (G , M) is 0. Thus, we know from Theorem 4.2 that, in every shadow price vector to (G w(e)+δ , M), the entry at e is 0. Let y * G , a cost allocation vector, and t * G , a shadow price vector, be part of the same optimal solution, S , to Fig. 1 ): tree multicast with source S1, receivers T 1 1 and T 1 2 and throughput 1; unicast with source S2, receiver T 2 and throughput 1. Optimal routing cost is 8 and max shadow price of edge e is 4. (b) Min-cost routing for the same two sessions in G − e. Optimal routing cost in G − e is 12 and hence unit Vickrey price is 4. Fig. 3 illustrates the equality relation in an example network. We next define a saturation-critical routing problem as one in which each link e satisfies either (a) the unit Vickrey price and the max shadow price are trivially equal at e because they are both zero, or (b) there exists an optimal flow f * such that f * (e) = c(e). Then following Theorem 4.3, we have:
the maximum shadow price equals the unit Vickrey price.
Due to the totally unimodular property of a node-link incidence matrix, all unicast problems always have integral optimal routing solutions [2] . For multicast, most randomly constructed networks satisfy this property. Contrived exceptions have been identified for network-coded multicast [14] ; the question remains open for multicast without network coding. All routing problems for which an integral optimal solution exists satisfy the saturation-critical property. Therefore, all unicast routing problems and most multicast routing problems are saturation-critical and hence the equality between maximum shadow price and unit Vickrey price holds.
C. The Relation between Shadow Prices and Vickrey Gain
The unit Vickrey gain problem arises naturally when a network operator wishes to answer questions such as: how much cost can be saved by augmenting a link e with an extra unit capacity, or which link should be chosen to furnish with extra bandwidth? Using the same techniques above, one can show that a corresponding equality exists between the unit Vickrey gain and the min shadow price. The only difference is that this relation is true for all routing problems and not just saturation-critical routing problems. So, the range of shadow prices at a link with respect to a saturation-critical routing problem falls exactly between the unit Vickrey gain and the unit Vickrey price. The complexity of our algorithm is dominated by a min-cost flow computation followed by an all-pair shortest path computation. The algorithmic complexity of the later is believed to be no worse than of the former. So, we conclude that the complexity of our algorithm is equivalent to O(1) min-cost flow computations [13] . This contrasts the (2|E|+1) min-cost flow computations required by a naive algorithm that computes the values by definition. It also advances previous work by Hershberger and Suri [6] , [7] that provides a reduction by a factor of O(|V |), for all-link Vickrey prices in the shortest path problem (a special case of single-path unicast routing).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Our contributions in this paper are: (1) a lower-bounded relation between shadow prices and Vickrey prices, (2) an equality relation between the max/min shadow price and the unit Vickrey price/gain, and (3) a new algorithm (without proof) for computing all-link unit Vickrey prices and gains for unicast routing. Two directions are open for future research: efficient algorithm design for computing all-link Vickrey prices in unicast networks and efficient algorithm design for computing all-link (unit) Vickrey prices in multicast networks.
